AN ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN THE CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Fifteen years ago, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("Convention") came into existence amid
much scholarly acclaim.' It has been called "the definitive international
legal instrument requiring respect for and observance of the human rights of
women; it is universal in reach, comprehensive in scope, and legally binding
in character."2 Unfortunately, however, the document's practical effects
have not been as revolutionary as its ideals.
The Convention has never attained the force of law in the United States.
President Carter signed the document in 1980 and submitted it to the Senate
for its advice and consent.3 However, Congress and the Reagan and Bush
administrations virtually ignored the Convention during the 1980s.' The
Senate did not hold a single day of hearings on the Convention until 1988.3
Currently, 131 states are parties to the Convention. 6 The United States
remains the only industrialized nation that has not ratified the Convention,

'Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened
for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
Convention].
2 Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of
DiscriminationAgainst Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643 (Spring 1990).
3 President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention on the Elimination
Against All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, S. Exec. Doc. 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Nov. 12, 1980) [hereinafter President's Message].
' See Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and InternationalHuman Rights
Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 53 (1990). Lillich describes the Reagan Administration's
position on international human rights law as one of "benign neglect or even outward
hostility." Id. at 54.
5 Issues Relating to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
DiscriminationAgainst Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Operationsof the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1988).
6

Adoption of the Report of the Committee on the Elimination of DiscriminationAgainst
Women on its Thirteenth Session, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 13th Session, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1994/L.1 (1994).
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although President Clinton recently announced his intent to seek ratification.7

The Commission on the Status of Women ("Commission"), a functional
body of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, began working on the
Convention in the early 1970s in response to the inadequacies of existing
human rights instruments in addressing the disadvantaged position of
women! While general human rights treaties, including the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, 9 the United Nations Charter, 0 and the Civil
and Political Covenant," guarantee rights without any distinctions based on
gender, women's rights have not been commonly classified as part of the
general human rights field. 2 The Commission's efforts culminated with the
drafting of the Women's Convention, which was unanimously adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1979 and entered into force with twenty ratifying
states in 1981."3
Prior human rights treaties have specifically addressed women's issues, 4

7 See David B. Ottaway, U.S. Callsfor Human Rights Czar, Seeks Vote on Carter-Era
Treaties, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 1993, at A7.

8 Andrea E. Stumpf, Re-examining the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of DiscriminationAgainst Women: The U.N. Decadefor Women Conference in Nairobi, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 384 (1985).

9Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
"Everyone is entitled to the rights set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any

kind." Id. at art. 2.

CHARTER art. 55(c). For the text of the provision, see infra note 45.
" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
10 U.N.

1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Civil and Political
Covenant]. '"The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right
of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present
Covenant." Id. at art. 2.
12 See Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of
Human Rights, 12 HuM. RTS. Q. 486 (1990). Bunch asserts that failure to see oppression of
women as "political" has resulted in the exclusion of gender discrimination and violence
against women from the general human rights agenda. lid at 491. See infra notes 104-111
and accompanying text.
'3 Convention, art. 27.
14 These include: Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature
Mar. 21, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention on Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value for
Men and Women, opened for signature June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303; Convention on
Consent to Marriage, of Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriage, opened
for signature Dec. 12, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231; Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women, opened for signature Feb. 29, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65; Convention on the Recovery
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but none have done so in such a comprehensive way. The Women's
Convention forbids any distinction, exclusion, or restriction between the
sexes which "has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women ...of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any
other field.""5 A unique and important feature of the Convention is its
recognition of discrimination outside of the public sphere, as evidenced by
the "any other field" language. In addition, by defining discrimination in
terms of "effect," the Convention obviates the need to prove discriminatory
6
intent.
The substantive provisions of the Convention, covering a broad range of
subjects, specifically enumerate forms of discrimination that States Parties
agree to eradicate. Article 2 places an affirmative obligation on States
Parties to procure equality of the sexes through national constitutions or
through legislation. 7 Article 5 requires parties to take all appropriate
measures to "modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices" which are
based on the idea that women are inferior.1
Articles 7 and 8 address
equality for women in the political life of States Parties.' 9 Under Article
9, States must grant women equal rights to acquire, change, or retain their
own nationality and the nationality of their children. 2° Parties are required
to provide equal educational opportunities for women according to Article

Abroad of Maintenance, opened for signature June 20, 1956, 268 U.N.T.S. 3.

Convention, art. 1.

1

6THjODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONs 60 (1986).

De facto discrimination stands as one of the biggest obstacles to equality for women. See
Implementation of Article 21 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 13th Session, Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1994/4

(1993).
"7Convention, art. 2. This article requires states to establish equal legal protection for
women by modifying or abolishing existing laws, practices, and customs which constitute

discrimination against women.

" Id.at art. 5.
19Id. at arts. 7, 8. Obligations

under Article 8 include the opportunity for women to

"represent their Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of
international organizations." Id. at art. 8.
20Id. at art. 9. This article ensures that women are not rendered stateless as a result of
marriage.
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10.21 Article 11 addresses employment and includes the right to equal job
opportunities, benefits, and pay.22 This article also mandates paid maternity
leave.' Article 12 requires equal access to health care, including appropriate services in connection with pregnancy.'
Article 15 provisions cover
equal rights with respect to the legal capacity of women, including the equal
right to form contracts and own or inherit property.'
The Convention established the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (composed of twenty-three
individuals from States Parties) which oversees the implementation of the
terms of the Convention. 6 The Committee meets once a year to consider
the progress of women's rights under the Convention and to make general
recommendations to states.27 Article 20(1) of the Convention authorizes the
Committee to meet for "a period of not more than two weeks each year."'
During its meeting time, the Committee examines reports submitted by states
on their progress toward eliminating gender discrimination.2 9 After
reviewing the reports, Committee members can make suggestions and general
recommendations to state representatives.3 The Committee has set some

21 Id.

at art. 10. In order to meet equal education obligations, parties must take measures

toward the "elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at all
levels and in all forms of education." Id. at art. 10(c).
22Id. at art. 11. This article advocates equal pay for "work of equal value."
23 id.
2 Id. at art. 12. This article states that women shall have equal access to "health care
services, including those related to family planning," but does not specifically mention
abortion. Id. at art. 12(1).
' Id. at art. 15. Under this article, States Parties agree that all contracts and private
instruments with any kind of legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of
women are "null and void." Id. at art. 15(3).
26Id at art. 17(1). Currently all members of the Committee are women. See List of
Participants,Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
13th Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/INF.I/Rev.2 (1994). Any State Party may nominate one
of its nationals to serve on the Committee. Members are selected by secret ballot.
Convention, art. 17(2).
27 Id. at arts. 20, 21.
2'Id. at art. 20(1). The two week term was extended in 1993 and 1994, but that is highly
unusual. Ways and Means of Expediting the Work of the Committee, Report by the
Secretariat, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 13th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 5, at 4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1994/6 (1993) [hereinafter Secretariat
Report].
29Convention, art. 20(1).
3 Id. at art. 21.
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general reporting guidelines, but frequently states do not adhere to those
guidelines. 31 In spite of 32the breadth of the Convention, the Committee's
success has been limited.
The Committee has functioned for thirteen years without any input or
assistance from the United States. However, after spending more than a
decade lingering on the back burner of American politics, the Convention
faces a more optimistic future in the United States. The Clinton Administration has taken a more favorable stance toward the Convention and other
unratified human rights treaties, 33 and has pledged to seek the advice and
consent of the Senate.' Whether the United States will ratify the Convention remains to be seen.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Human rights treaties have historically enjoyed little success in the United
States, in part because American courts have not interpreted their provisions
liberally. The Constitution provides that all treaties made "under the
Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land. 35
However, the courts in this country have not interpreted human rights treaties
as having this level of binding authority, even though American constitutional rights have served as the basic model for many international human rights

3'The Committee's guidelines suggest that a country's initial report be divided into two
parts. The first part should contain information about the country's political, legal, and social
framework, as well as measures taken to implement the Convention. The second part should
detail steps taken to implement individual articles of the Convention. General guidelines
regarding the form and content of reports received from States Parties under Article 18 of
the Convention, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 2nd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/7 (1983).
32 Andrew C. Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work on the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14 YALE J.INT. L. 1, 5.
(1989). See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
33The other treaties are: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Race
Convention]; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and, Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.
Treaty Series No. 36, at 1.
3 Ottaway, supra note 7, at AT.
31U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
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instruments.36
In order to provide enforceable rights, a treaty must be self-executing, or
non-self-executing but accompanied by implementing legislation. 37 A selfexecuting treaty becomes law immediately upon entering into force. In
contrast, Congress must pass implementing legislation before a non-selfexecuting treaty can have any legal effect in the United States. After
Congress passes legislation, that legislation becomes the binding rule of law
for U.S. courts, rather than the treaty itself. 38 If implementing legislation
is not passed, the United States could, technically, be held in violation of the

treaty for non-compliance.39

Courts have determined whether a treaty is self-executing by examining
the language of the treaty and the intention of the parties.' Although the
Supreme Court has suggested that treaties should be construed in a "broad
and liberal spirit,"' 1 the courts have not approached human rights treaties
in this way, almost uniformly holding that human rights clauses are non-selfexecuting.42 Many states are apprehensive about the consequences of
human rights treaties because interpretation of their scope is less predictable
than that of commercial treaties.43

-6Lillich, supra note 4; Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 405 (1979). Henkin observes that most of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the Civil and Political Covenant are essentially American constitutional rights. Id. at 415.
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrIED STATES § 115

cmt. e (1987). A non-self-executing agreement is "not effective as law until implemented by
legislative or executive action." Id.
38 Lillich, supra note 4, at 62.
39RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115

cmt. b (1987). "Although Congress may supersede a rule of international law or an
international agreement as domestic law, the United States remains bound by the agreement
internationally." Id.
' See, e.g., Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974).
Factors the court examined to determine intention included purpose of the treaty, institutions
available for direct implementation, and immediate and long range social consequences of self
or non self-execution. Id. at 97.
4'Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). Although this case involved a bilateral
treaty, the principle of construction and the test used to determine whether the treaty was selfexecuting are equally applicable to multilateral international human rights instruments.
Lillich, supra note 4, at 62.
42Lillich, supra note 4, at 62.
' Cook, supra note 2, at 650. A state sacrifices a degree of autonomy by ratifying any
international agreement. However, human rights treaties do not offer a commercial advantage
to states that would make this sacrifice worthwhile. Id.
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The leading case on this point is Sei Fujii v. State," where the California
District Court of Appeals struck down a provision of the California Alien
Land Law which vested power in the state to seize land transferred to an
illegal alien. The Court of Appeals held that the statute violated the
nondiscriminatory provisions found in Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter.45
The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision based solely on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' It rejected the
lower court's reliance on the U.N. Charter, stating that Articles 55 and 56
"lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent
to create justiciable rights in private persons upon ratification., 47 -The court
objected to the use of the words "shall promote" 48 in the Charter's nondiscriminatory provisions. 9 Many clauses in the Women's Convention
contain similarly "vague" language, obligating parties to "take appropriate
measures" 50
The Convention, if ratified, will probably encounter considerable legal
obstacles resulting from the prevailing attitude of the U.S. courts toward
international law.5 1 These legal obstacles may prevent the Convention from
having any practical impact on U.S. law.

III. ANALYSIS
Thirteen years after entering into force, it is clear that the Convention has
not brought about the revolutionary changes in women's rights that its
provisions mandate. Flaws in the document itself partly account for the
Convention's limited success. The Convention's vague policy on reservations, the limited authority it delegates to the Committee, and pervasive

44 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950), aff'd on other grounds, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal.

1952).

45 Id. at 486. The text of this article states that nations shall promote "universal respect

for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
4Sei
Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
47 Id. at 621-22. This view has been generally rejected by scholars in the international
human rights field but routinely followed by the U.S. courts. Lillich, supra note 4, at 63.
48 U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
'9 Lillich, supra note 4, at 63. See supra note 45 for the text of Article 55(c).
o Articles 2,*3, 5-8, 10-14, and 16, representing twelve of the Convention's sixteen
substantive articles, contain this language.
51See Lillich, supra note 4.
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cultural gender bias among its parties have impeded progress in women's
rights under the Convention.
A. Reservations
Effects of the Convention have been diluted, with at least twenty-five
parties making a total of sixty-eight reservations52 to substantive provisions.53 This large number of reservations makes the Convention among
the most heavily reserved of international human rights instruments. 54 The
Convention allows reservations that do not conflict with the "object and
purpose" of the treaty, but it contains no objective criteria to determine if
this requirement has been met. 55 This approach stands in contrast to the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, which has served as the model for the Women's Convention
in many other respects.56 According to the Race Convention, reservations
are not allowed unless they are approved by two-thirds of all other States
Parties. Drafters of the Women's Convention had to choose between the
conflicting policies of maximizing participation and maintaining the integrity
of the document.5 8 A look at some of the reservations entered by States
Parties indicates that the Convention's drafters opted for the former.
1. Islamic Reservations
Among the more prevalent reservations to the Convention are those made
by countries in which women have second-class status resulting from Islamic
52 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as a unilateral

statement made by a state "whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, at art. 2(d).
13 Meeting of States Parties to the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 7th Meeting, Provisional Agenda Item 6, at 9-33, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/1994/2 (1993) [hereinafter CEDA W Report].
54 Cook, supra note 2, at 644.
5 Convention, art. 28.
s Cook, supra note 2, at 644.
57 Race Convention, supra note 33, at art. 20(2). The number of reservations to the Race
Convention is much lower, with only 3 states making reservations to substantive provisions.
RIcHARD B. LucH, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RGirs INSTRUMENTS 160.13-160.30 (1990).
5S Cook, supra note 2, at 644.
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law and other cultural practices. 59 Many states have made reservations
stating that they do not consider themselves bound by provisions of Article
2 to the extent that those provisions conflict with provisions of Islamic
law.' For example, Iraq has made unexplained reservations to Article 2(f)
and (g).61 Article 2(f) requires states to "take all appropriate measures
including legislation to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against women." 62 Article
2(g) requires repeal of penal laws that discriminate against women. 63 Libya
made a general reservation stating that accession to the Convention cannot
conflict with Islamic laws on "personal status."" Egypt made a reservation
to Article 16, which concerns equality of men and women in all matters of
marriage and family relations.65
All of these reservations have been accepted, even though they appear to
conflict with the object and purpose of the treaty. The purpose of the
Convention is the elimination of discrimination, and all of these reservations
clearly hinder that objective. In essence, they permit discrimination. The
Convention allows states to commit themselves to women's equality, while
simultaneously admitting that they have no intention of granting women
equality. In effect, the Convention permits a state to deny basic rights to
half of its national population under the guise of freedom of religion.
Although a number of other states have made objections to these reservations, the objections have no legal effect on the reserving states. 66 The
Committee has decided to "take steps" in common with other human rights
treaty bodies to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice that would clarify the issue of reservations and thereby assist states
in ratification and implementation of human rights instruments like the
Convention. 7 If the Committee takes those steps, reservations may have
a less detrimental effect on the Convention in the future.

9For texts of reservations and declarations, see CEDAW Report, supra note 53.
Id Article 2 of the Convention requires states to "condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms." Id.
60

61 CEDAW
6

Report, supra note 53, at 16.

Convention, art. 2(f).
art. 2(g).

63Convention,

" CEDAW Report, supra note 53, at 18.
65 Id at 12. The provisions of the Shariah require a husband to pay "bridal" money to
the wife and "maintain her fully". In exchange, the wife's right to divorce is restricted. Id.

66 For texts of objections entered, see CEDAW Report, supra note 53, at 34-41.
67Secretariat Report, supra note 28, at 4.
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2. Likely U.S. Reservations
If the United States ratifies the Convention, it will likely join the ranks of
states making extensive reservations, thereby giving the Convention little
legal or practical effect in the United States. When the Convention was
submitted to the Senate in 1980, the State Department included a memorandum which identified potential conflicts with U.S. law and recommended
appropriate reservations or declarations to that effect.'
Since many of the specific areas covered by the Convention are regulated
in the United States by state law, the State Department recommends a
general reservation stating the limits of federal jurisdiction.' The State
Department lists education, family law, prostitution, and property rights as
areas of concern, since each of these areas are regulated by state law.7°
Another proposed reservation would address possible constitutional conflicts.
Article 2, which prohibits discrimination by any "person, organization, or
enterprise,' ' 71 may conflict with freedom of association under the Constitu-

tion.72 A final reservation would state that the Convention is non-selfexecuting in the United States, and therefore would require Congress to pass
implementing legislation."
As repugnant as these reservations may be to anyone desiring change to
come from ratification of the Convention, history suggests that the Senate
will probably accept them. The Senate's approach to ratification of the Civil
and Political Covenant and the Torture Convention illustrates the attitude of
the Senate toward State Department recommendations. 74 Both of these
documents were ratified subject to reservations similar to those that have

President's Message, supra note 3, app. F, at 140.

I& A treaty supersedes inconsistent state law, but it cannot extend federal jurisdiction.
The federal government cannot pass laws for the states. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. e (1987). A non-self-executing treaty
may supersede an inconsistent state law, but not until it is implemented by federal legislation.

Id; U.S. CONST. amend X.
" President's Message, supra note 3, at 1-8.
71Convention, art. 2(e).
' President's Message supra note 3, at 1. By its terms the Convention would apply to
private organizations and areas of personal conduct not covered by U.S. law. I&
" Id. at app. F. Language throughout this document refers to appropriate implementing
legislation.
74Executive Session; International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 138 CONG.
REC. S4781 (1992).

1994]

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN

been proposed for the Women's Convention." While no formal proposals
have yet been made on ratification of the Convention, recently proposed
reservations for the Race Convention include those discussed above, which
lends further support to the probability that these reservations will accompany the Women's Convention. 6
The position taken by some Convention supporters also indicates the
likelihood of reservations. Somewhat paradoxically, many supporters of the
Convention point out that it should be ratified because it is "basically
compatible with U.S. law and would not effectuate any change.""7
Some detractors argue that without these reservations, the Convention is
too broad and would have far-reaching and undesirable effects in the United
States.78 One commentator believes that the overbreadth of the Convention
could lead to overly intrusive government action and interference with
individuals' rights to privacy and freedom of association.79 It seems highly
unlikely, however, that ratification of the Convention would bring about a
rash of legislation that would give women too many rights.
In addition, even if Congress ratifies the Convention without declarations
or reservations, its practical effect will still be minimal. Other states know
the inherent limitations of a federal system. Unconstitutional treaty
provisions are never given any effect as law. s° Lastly, without a selfexecuting provision, the courts would probably hold the Convention to be
non-self-executing. 8 ' Although the United States might technically be in
violation of the Convention in these situations, the Convention contains no
consequences for non-compliance.
7S Id.

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 22, May 30, 1994 (Statement of Conrad K. Harper
before Senate Foreign Relations Committee), available in LEXIS, Exec Library, DState file.
77See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1990).
The American Bar Association is one organization that takes this position about ratification.
Id. at 68.
78 MERON, supra note 16, at 62-79.
" Id. at 62. Meron speculates that freedom of opinion, expression, and belief could all
be endangered by the Convention.
80 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(3)
(1987).
s1Lillich, supra note 4, at 76-77. Lillich believes that human rights instruments, like the
Convention, will have their greatest impact through indirectly assisting courts in interpreting
constitutional and statutory standards, rather than as self-executing domestic laws. Id.
76
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B. The Women's Committee
The work of the Committee further illustrates the lack of serious
commitment to women's rights in the international community. Although
the Convention established the Committee as an enforcement mechanism, the
Committee possesses extremely limited powers to enforce the Convention's
provisions.8 2 In the years since its creation, the Committee has overcome
some of its initial difficulties, but continues to lag behind other human rights
treaty bodies and has failed to make much of a practical contribution in its
field. Among the Committee's shortcomings are the limitations on its
meeting time, its dependence on state self-reporting, its reluctance to adopt
formal recommendations, its lack of power to interpret the Convention's
substantive provisions, and its inability to hear individual complaints.
The Committee's short meeting time has resulted in a backlog of reports,
with an average of three years elapsing from the time a state submits its
report until the Committee considers that report.83 The Committee's time
constraints have been slightly alleviated with the implementation of a presession work week.8 In contrast, the other major treaties do not limit the
meeting time of their respective committees. 5 The notion that a committee
overseeing implementation of the Women's Convention would require
considerably less time than the Racial Committee needed8 for its work is a
reflection of the low priority assigned to women's rights. 6
The Convention authorizes the Committee to meet at "United Nations
Headquarters or at any other convenient place."8' Until recently, the "other
convenient place" was Vienna, the location of the Division for the Advance-

8 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
' Secretariat Report, supra note 28, at 5. This lack of timeliness in considering reports

has served as a disincentive for states to report. l
" The pre-session working group consists of five Committee members who prepare lists
of questions for countries that will present reports in the upcoming session. See CEDAW
Report, supra note 6.
83See Race Convention. supra note 33; Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 11;

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 33; Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted
Dec. 10, 1984 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
86 Byrnes, supra note 32, at 59.
Byrnes asserts that there is a perception among
Committee members that it is the "poor cousin" of human rights treaty bodies and is provided
with technical and legal resources far below those provided to other treaty bodies. Id. at 46.
87Convention, art. 20(2).
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ment of Women, which provides administrative support for the Committee.
However, the other six major treaty bodies are serviced by the Centre for
Human Rights, which is located in Geneva.88 The Committee was thus
separated from experts and technical resources located in Geneva. The
Committee has suffered from inadequate professional support in terms of
necessary legal expertise."' The Committee's geographic problem was
corrected in 1993, when the Division for the Advancement of Women was
transferred to United Nations Headquarters in New York, where the Centre
for Human Rights also maintains an office."
The Committee relies on reports from States Parties to complete its work,
but the accuracy of these reports is inherently suspect, since they are
prepared by government officials.9 1 The Committee has failed to create
uniform reporting standards,' and states will often not include areas of
controversy in their reports.93 In addition, most states have not adhered to
the reporting schedule.'
While Committee members often make informal criticisms to state
representatives, formal recommendations have not been forthcoming.9" The
Committee has been somewhat reluctant to adopt formal recommendations
or suggestions directed at individual states, because, unlike the other major
committees, the Women's Committee has no procedure for formulating

'8

Secretariat Report, supra note 28, at 8; Byrnes, supra note 32, at 57.

"

Report of the Chairperson,Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against

Women, 13th Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1994/L.1/Add. 5 (1994), at 5.
0 Secretariat Report, supra note 28, at 8.

9 Byrnes, supra note 32, at 13. In addition to the obvious issue of government
propaganda, another problem is that experts in women's affairs are not experts in human
rights reporting, and experts in human rights reporting may lack knowledge of women's
affairs. Id.
9 Among the reports considered in 1994, Japan submitted a lengthy report which included
50 pages of statistics on education, employment, and gender related crimes. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention, Committee

on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JPN/3 (1993).
Libya submitted a seven-page report placing most of the blame for inequality on the U.N.
embargo on that country. See Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties Under

Article 18 of the Convention, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LIB/I/Add.1 (1993).
93 Id. at 14.
SecretariatReport, supra note 28, at 6.
9 Byrnes, supra note 32 at 44. See SecretariatReport, supra note 28. In 12 sessions the
'4

Committee has adopted 20 formal recommendations. Id.
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written comments on reports. 96
The Committee can formulate general analyses of the Convention's
substantive provisions but has no power to authoritatively interpret them.'
In addition, it has no quasi-judicial power to pronounce a state in violation
of the Convention. The Convention states that any disputes concerning
interpretations or applications of the Convention may be submitted to the
International Court of Justice for arbitration.9" However, the Convention
does not contain a procedure for state-to-state complaints. The Race
Convention, the Civil and Political Covenant, and the Torture Convention all
set out detailed procedures to deal with state-to-state complaints."
The Convention also lacks a right of petition which would enable
individuals to make complaints for violations, a procedure allowed by the
Race Convention, the Torture Convention, and the Civil and Political
Covenant."°
According to each of these conventions, the power for
individuals to file complaints is conditioned upon states agreeing to optional
protocols. 1°' The Committee has adopted a suggestion that a study should
be prepared on the feasibility of drafting an optional protocol, in order to put°2
the Convention on the same footing as other human rights conventions.1
The Committee might have some difficulty adjudicating complaints,
however, since complaints would include situations where a state failed to
act, as well as instances of affirmative discrimination.10 3

96 See SecretariatReport, supra note 28, at 10.
97 Convention, art. 21. The Committee is only authorized to "make suggestions and

general recommendations." Id at art. 21(1).
" Convention, art. 29(1). Twenty-one states have made reservations to this article. See
CEDAW Report, supra note 53.
99 Race Convention, supra note 33, at art. 1 1-13; Civil and Political Covenant, supra note
11, at art. 41-42; Torture Convention, supra note 85, at art. 21.
"0 Race Convention, supra note 33, at art. 14; Torture Convention, supra note 85, at art.
22; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 301.
1o1Id.
102 SecretariatReport, supra note 28, at 7. This is only a suggestion for a study. The
Women's Commission would have to make a recommendation to the United Nations before
it would consider undertaking such a study, which the Commission has not done. The
limitation on meeting time would have to be removed before an optional protocol could be
implemented. Id.
103Id. Many of the Conventions provisions involve affirmative rights and obligate States
to take action.
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C. Societal Issues
The Convention and the Committee reflect the society that created them.
Responsibility for the weaknesses of the Committee lies with the states that
drafted the Convention, which are apparently not ready to embrace women's
equality wholeheartedly. t 4 Women's rights are still commonly regarded
as secondary to general "human" rights.' °5
Discrimination against women still receives inadequate legal attention,
even in the United States. Abuse and discrimination take place all over the
world on a daily basis in countries that have committed themselves to
equality by ratifying the Convention. 6 Socioeconomic conditions frequently arise as an excuse for failing to comply with the Convention."
Even when equality is the law, the reality for many women around the world
does not reflect legal equality."1 8 Acts of violence and discrimination
against women are frequently tolerated publicly, and often treated as the
product of particular cultural or religious practice or the isolated actions of
individuals, rather than as violations of international law. 9 Human rights
activists pressure states to prevent racial discrimination, even when the
perpetrators are "private entities," while often ignoring discrimination against
women when it takes place in the private sphere. 1 States are in complici-

'04Byrnes, supra note 32, at 59.
'05 Bunch, supra note 12, at 486.
106 See DEPT. OF STATE, 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (1994) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT]. This report, compiled from American officials, foreign officials, private
citizens, victims of abuse, congressional studies, intelligence information, press reports,
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, details human rights abuses
in 193 countries. Id. at Appendix A.
107 See, e.g., Adoption of the Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Its Thirteenth Session, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1994/L.1 (1994). The
representative from Guatemala states that socioeconomic context should be taken into account
in determining whether its national policy should be considered discriminatory to women.
Id. at Add. 6. Similarly, the representative from Zambia states that women's rights cannot
be an issue until the national economy improves. Id. at Add. 7.
108Id. The State Department's report details numerous examples of countries where
women are equal under domestic law, and yet continue to suffer due to their gender.
109 Pamela Goldberg and Nancy Kelly, InternationalHuman Rights and Violence Against
Women, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 195, 196 (1993); Riane Eisler, Human Rights: Toward an
Integrated Theory for Action, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 287 (1987); Bunch, supra note 12, at 490.
in0 Bunch, supra note 12, at 491.
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ty for failing to provide adequate legal redress."'
The situation in Brazil provides a typical example. In Brazil, at least 400
women were murdered by their husbands or paramours between 1987 and
1989."2 Most of these men were acquitted or given reduced sentences,
based on the honor defense, whereby perceived adulterous conduct provides
the grounds for acquittal or mitigated sentences.1 3 Mistaken belief or
other circumstances do not necessarily defeat the honor defense." 4 While
Brazilian law does not condone murder, acquittals continue due to societal
attitudes reflected in Brazilian juries, which persist in setting wife-killers
free."' When viewed in the context of the Brazilian situation, the Convention becomes little more than United Nations rhetoric that does not help the
people it is intended to protect. As a party to the Convention, Brazil could
technically be held in violation for this situation." 6 However, the Committee has no power to pronounce a violation, and even if it did, there are no
consequences for such a violation. This situation illustrates the most
important weakness of the Convention: women in discriminatory and
abusive situations, in Brazil and elsewhere, cannot rely on this Convention
to help them.
The Convention has had a somewhat positive impact in raising awareness
about women's issues, according to some representatives who have presented
reports to the Committee." 7 The importance of awareness cannot be
understated, since cultural norms remain one of the greatest obstacles for
women in achieving equality. The Committee played a role in drawing
attention to women's rights at the 1993 World Human Rights Conference.
The Conference set the goal of universal ratification of the Convention by
"' Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the PubliciPrivate
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 87 (1993). Romany
asserts that the public/private distinction is a fallacy because negative conceptions of freedom
(i.e., the right to be left alone without interference from other persons) reinforces subordination of women. Id. at 100.
112 AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE:

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN

BRAZIL 20-24 (1992).
113 Romany, supra note 111, at 116.
114 id.

"5 Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 106. Although the honor defense was
overturned in a 1991 case, acquittals continue, and courts are still reluctant to convict men
who attack their wives. In Porto Alegre, Brazil, an average of 1500 domestic violence
complaints per month were filed in 1993. Police were not aware of any convictions. Id.
116 Romany, supra note 111, at 119.
117 Secretariat Report, supra note 28.
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the year 2000.118 At the Committee's most recent session, Committee
members seemed acutely aware of their limitations and made an encouraging
effort to deal with some of these problems. Closer cooperation between the
Committee and other human rights treaty bodies appears to be forthcoming,
and will perhaps allow the Committee to overcome its secondary status and
join the general human rights agenda. 1 9
IV. CONCLUSION

As a leader in the field of women's rights, the United States should take
prompt action in ratifying the Convention. Federalism and current attitudes
towards international human rights instruments found in the U.S. courts,
combined with likely reservations, may render the legal effect of the
Convention in the United States less than significant. However, by ratifying
the Convention, the United States would be able to participate in the work
of the Committee and take an active leadership role in its activities.
The Committee, while still a relatively weak treaty body, has progressed
in its thirteen years of existence. Committee members seem acutely aware
of the Convention's shortcomings and are attempting to overcome their
problems, but progress remains slow. The Convention has not drastically
changed the status of women in countries that are already parties to it.
Reservations have weakened the Convention's overall effect and will
continue to do so until the Committee takes steps to rectify this problem.
The results in the United States would probably not be much different.
Until the Committee can formulate a procedure to deal with complaints
from states or from individuals, a procedure other major treaty bodies allow,
the Convention cannot provide legal redress and can do little more than
attempt to raise awareness of women's issues. Awareness and understanding
are key factors in overcoming archaic cultural norms that persist around the
world.
The United States should view the Convention's weaknesses and failures
as a challenge for the future. By ratifying the Convention, the United States
affords itself the opportunity to utilize its position as a leader in women's
rights to influence international standards.
Julie A. Minor
us Report of the Chairperson, supra note 89, at 3.
"9 See Secretariat Report, supra note 28.

